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E. E.  Constance Jones endorsed a standard late nineteenth-century conception of the
extension-intension distinction: “by the extension or denotation of a term I mean the
things to which it applies”, whereas “by its intension I mean those properties or qualities
of the things which it signiﬁes” (Jones 1911: 12). She makes two observations:
A.Knowledge of  the intension of  a term does not  guarantee that  we can identify  its
extension.
B. Knowledge of the extension of a term does not guarantee knowledge of its intension.
Regarding (A) Jones writes: “I may have full descriptive knowledge” of X “and yet not be
able to recognise” X – “though it may much concern me to do so” (ibid.: 13). This is an
instance of the puzzle of informative identity (see Identity / Nonidentity): although that
ﬁgure is a chiliagon is true, I might be unable to ascertain its truth, even though the ﬁgure
is indeed thousand-sided and I am fully aware that chiliagons are thousand-sided.
While (B) parallels Russell’s (1905: 487) claim that there is “no backward road” from
reference  to  sense,  because  every  object  can  be  referred  to  in  inﬁnitely  many  diﬀerent
ways, Jones’s observation is in fact deeper, anticipating insights due to Hilary Putnam and
Saul Kripke. On Jones’s view, one may be able to distinguish the elements in the extension
of a term T from those in its complement and yet be incapable of coming up with a feature
that all members of T’s extension share: “I may know real diamonds from paste […] and
always  apply  the  [term]  rightly,  and  yet  be  unable  to  set  out  even  to  myself  the
connotation or intension” (1911: 13). Similarly, Evans argued that the capacity to identify
and refer to a given person across various scenarios – which is also the capacity to
distinguish that person from others across these scenarios – is distinct from the capacity
to cite a description uniquely true of that person.
Jones  articulated  the  distinction  between  intension  and  extension  already  in  1890,
How to cite  this  article:  Jeanne Peijnenburg,  Gary Ostertag & 2019.  "Intension /  Extension in  Emily
Elizabeth Constance Jones (1848–1922)", in Waithe, Mary Ellen & Hagengruber, Ruth (eds.): Encyclopedia
of Concise Concepts by Women Philosophers. DOI: (DOI pending) [12|11|2019].
https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/ecc/
2/2
referring  to  it  as  the  distinction  between  determination  and  denomination  (see
Denomination / Determination).
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